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Greece Bears Gifts 
 
While the UK is engulfed by Brexit, a battle for the strategic direction of the country, the European 
Union faces a low key but even deeper, existential crisis. Europe has tried to unite, shape its future 
through consensus rather than war and retain its economic and diplomatic weight in a global 
landscape increasingly dominated by giants. However, what seemed like a sound strategy for a core 
of European countries, started becoming problematic when the union extended its borders to 28 
countries with, inevitably, different levels of economic development, social values and visions for the 
EU’s future. As a result, politically the union is heterogeneous, with a weak centre in Brussels and 
centrifuge forces in its periphery. Economically -as the Greek crisis shows - the Eurozone remains 
fiscally uncoordinated and prone to spiralling imbalances.  
These underlying weaknesses were inevitably sharpened and exposed when the prosperous years 
ended by the severe economic crisis of 2008, followed by a sovereign debt crisis in the union’s 
South. And no case has tested the EU’s resolve harder than the never-ending Greek problem: A 
Sisyphean burden created not just by the incompetence of a series of Greek governments and the 
economic culture of their electorate, but also through the lack of institutional forethought, oversight 
and power in Brussels. A problem moreover that unless tackled in earnest and systematically it is 
bound to resurface.  
 
EU’s dilemma and the largest bail out in economic history 
The Greek crisis first came to global spotlight in 2009, when it was revealed that its government had 
lied about the country’s deficit. The hole in the national accounts was a dizzying 15% of the GDP. The 
news sparked fears of a Greek default in the bonds market: the country already had one of the 
highest government debts in the EU and relatively low levels of economic development and 
capitalisation. Bond spreads for Greek debt started rising, reaching 35% in 2012, and Greece was 
effectively cut-out from the money markets. This is when the country turned to her EU partners to 
cover her deficits and re-finance her debts.  
The Greek request came at a bad time for EU countries. The Eurozone was in recession, 
unemployment was high and Europeans were angry with their establishment. There were 
widespread calls from both the political Left and Right to abandon Greece and force her out of the 
Euro. Yet, to their merit, after a few grunts and some ambivalence, EU leaders and parliaments 
decided to support their ailing ally by lending Greece over 300 billion euros, by far the largest bail-
out package in economic history.  
Some have suggested that the EU’s ulterior motive had been to protect their banks. The argument 
goes that a large percentage of the Greek government debt in 2010 was in the hands of the already 
weakened German and French banks. If Greece was to default on its debts then these banks would 
default too. This perceived weakness of the EU even led Varoufakis, the Greek minister of economics 
under the newly elected government of Syriza in 2015, to demand from the EU that the Greek debt 
be largely written off. His ethical justification was strong and based on moral hazard: European 
banks and private lenders sought to maximise their profit by lending money to a country with weak 
macroeconomic fundamentals – now they should accept their losses. Varoufakis also pointed out 
that under the terms of its first bail-out package in 2010, Greece had to use 45 billion of bail-out 
funds to buy private sector debt – this burden had now become a Greek taxpayer burden. Should 
taxpayers endure harsh austerity to cover the losses of risk-taking private investors? Syriza 
threatened to refuse European money and lead Greece to a controlled bankruptcy, damaging 
systemic Eurozone banks and re-fuelling the recession in Europe.  
Varoufakis made good points but downplayed a few key facts, and most of all the need for reforms 
in the Greek economy. The fact is that in 2012 the EU did write off massive amounts of Greek debt 
held by the private sector in Greece and abroad. Banks and investors lost between 59 to 65% of their 
investments in Greek bonds and the Greek national debt was reduced by an unprecedented 107 
billion euros, about 50% of the country’s GDP at the time (Zettelmeyer, 2013)1. The Greek 
negotiating position was also weak: by the time the Greek government threatened to default their 
country, in 2015, only about 35 billion euros were still in the hands of private investors. This amount 
could not back a credible threat against a Eurozone whose GDP at the time was over 10.5 trillion 
euros. Most importantly, Syriza’s political programme was fundamentally against the deep structural 
economic reforms that the Greek economy desperately needed2 -- Syriza had gained power by 
promising the exhausted Greek voters that a successful negotiation with EU would bring not only a 
quick end to austerity but also a return to the spending habits that accumulated hundreds of billions 
of debt in the first place.  
Much like in the Brexit negotiations, EU countries would not accept demands which might threaten 
the long-term stability of their union. Their concern was that if an even higher proportion of the 
Greek debt was written off, then a very dangerous precedent would be created. 2 trillion euros of 
Italian debt could be next. The EU asked the Greek government to start preparing the country’s exit 
from the Eurozone, and then the Greek government capitulated and signed the EU deal. Brutal 
austerity continued for the Greeks and the country committed to produce high and continuous fiscal 
surpluses until the 2060s. These nearly impossible surpluses will be keeping taxes high, investments 
low, limit public services such as education and healthcare at critical levels, fuel brain drain and 
dampen growth in the country. Much like the punitive reparations imposed to the German people 
after the First World War, the imposition of such targets on the Greeks is a bleak promise for the 
future.  
 
Greek background and dysfunction  
At the height of the crisis, global media simply labelled the nation as reluctant to pay taxes but 
typically avoided to offer some analysis of the problem. Low tax revenues were indeed a part of the 
Greek problem. The fact is that Greek tax collection is inherently problematic because economic 
activity takes place in sectors and communities which are traditionally difficult to measure and tax. 
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The economy of this 10 million country historically consisted of small and very small businesses, 
often family managed. According to the latest Eurostat data, 11% of the Greek workforce are 
farmers, working a land that is often arid and broken into small production units – for comparison, in 
the UK the equivalent percentage is 1.5%. Tourism directly employs about 17% of the workforce in 
peak season and indirectly supports the incomes of an extra 25% of workers. It is inherently difficult 
to monitor production and tax on such a small scale. To that, we should also add the fact that for 
historical reasons local communities are tightly knit, especially when it comes to tax. This social 
capital allows them to protect their local income from what they perceive as a corrupt centre: the 
car mechanic will offer his services for cash in hand to locals, and so will the hairdresser, the private 
tutor and many others. A weak tax base does not necessarily lead to high government debt though; 
in fact low income countries tend to have relatively low debt as a percentage of their GDP. The 
Greek dysfunction lies elsewhere.   
The Greek demise came from excessive government spending. Since the 1980’s most governments 
won elections promising more and more, in everything. Pensions came from the age of 45 in some 
cases, subsidised heavily from state revenues. Various trades and professions received preferential 
tax treatment and subsidies. Healthcare expenditure was so generous that it ended up costing 
double per capita than in other European countries. Every year additional jobs in the civil service 
were created, addressing real or imaginary needs. Even bankrupt football clubs had their debts 
assumed by the Greek government. Greece spent more on arms as a percentage of its GDP than any 
other EU country except for Britain – Greeks are concerned that a 1974 Cyprus-style Turkish invasion 
to one of their islands is a real possibility and are locked into an arms race with Turkey, a country 
eight times the Greek population. And of course the country had to borrow 9 billion euros to host 
the 2004 Olympic Games – double the initial budget. Ironically, Greek citizens did not benefit from 
the spending spree as much as one would expect. High levels of corruption meant that the level of 
services offered remained low, while the country’s economic and political oligarchy pocketed a hefty 
percentage of what was spent (and borrowed).  
One can only wonder, how did the country that gave birth to democratic accountability end up 
pawning the future of her younger generations in a frenzy of spending? The answer is complex, 
extends far beyond economics and this article can only offer a few facts and thoughts. On a cultural 
level, Greece is a patriarchal society which expects the State to guide, protect and provide. On a 
political level, we find a country where the Right aggressively oppressed the Left after the 1945-49 
Greek Civil War. And when the political Left eventually came to power in the early 80s with the first 
government of PASOK, its socialist economic policies were in turn aggressive – and expensive. These 
debt-fuelled socialist policies progressively permeated the Right too - indicatively the Greek 
government deficit of 15% mentioned at the beginning of this article came during the right-wing 
government of Kostas Karamanlis Junior. On a societal level, corruption has long been tolerated, 
factored in and expected by the Greek society, especially when it concerns public funds. Corruption 
dampens the economic performance of the country, its competitiveness, its expenses and its tax 
receipts.  
Special mention should be given to the governance and leadership of Greece on a high level. More 
than other European countries, the country is ruled by an interlinked political and economic 
oligarchy. The international press often marvels at the fact that a mere three families seem to have 
ruled the country for many decades. Since 1944 when the country was freed from the Nazis, these 
three political dynasties governed Greece for about half the 75 years till our present day, supplying 
six prime ministers in the process. Indicatively, the current head of the main opposition party and 
prime-minister-in-waiting is yet another member of this political elite. The country’s economy is not 
too different, with a handful of powerful families having a disproportionate power over the 
country’s banks, the energy sector, construction, pharmaceutical provisions and more. Many of 
these families have stakes in large media and football clubs in a (successful) effort to extending their 
economic power into political influence. Greece is not a meritocracy and competition doesn’t work 
well, particularly in the higher echelons of the society and economy. Greece is largely run by people 
with too much power and little skill, whose primary objective is the preservation of the status quo 
rather than reform. One of the key reasons behind Syriza’s electoral successes was that fact that it 
was comprised by people largely perceived as idealists and outsiders to power and wealth.  
 
Greek dysfunctions magnified by EU failures 
It is not certain if the revelation about the magnitude of the Greek deficit was a complete surprise to 
EU leaders and institutions – what is certain however is that the EU was woefully unprepared to deal 
with it, on many levels. The European Union had to call in the IMF, partly in order to offer 
technocratic assistance as was advertised but also to offer assurances to angry European 
parliaments that the intervention would be assertive (and punitive) enough. The European Union 
lacked not only any bailout expertise but also the confidence and the political justification for 
helping one of its members. And this was only one of its many institutional shortcomings that 
magnified the Greek crisis.  
To start with, economists and even Greek governments admitted that the country was not ready to 
enter the Eurozone, in 2001. The country had again faked its statistics and was far from attaining the 
minimum economic criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. Specifically, annual 
government deficits had always been far above 3% and the total government debt nearly double the 
60% stipulated by the treaty. The country’s competitiveness would struggle in a monetary union 
with fixed exchange rates. However, Greeks were not alone in ignoring the rules and cooking their 
books. Other countries, such as Italy, France and Germany had done the same. EU economic 
decision making was subject to political rather actual reality. Rules were written down but were 
never really enforced and that was a bad start and a handicap for the Eurozone.  
Then EU’s bank regulatory framework made things worse for Greece by allowing the country to 
borrow more than it could handle. Banks could buy government debt without having capital 
themselves, encouraging a “carry trade” for bonds. So, German and French banks borrowed money 
cheaply from their central banks, bought relatively high-yielding bonds from the weaker Eurozone 
countries and made easy profits, without committing their own capital. Imagine a situation where an 
individual without their own funds or collateral can borrow money at 1% and lend it to someone else 
at 10%, creating an easy cash flow. The inevitable competition for such easy profits made banks 
compete for lending to Greece, lowering the country’s interest rate further – from 10% to around 
4%. This means that when Greece entered the Eurozone it gained access to an Eldorado of cheap 
lending money and eager lenders. The Greek political system couldn’t handle the temptation. And 
the EU didn’t handle the regulation.   
Once in the Eurozone, countries found themselves monetarily bound but uncoordinated in terms of 
fiscal and supply-side policies. The European Commission lacks the legal and political tools to enforce 
even a general common direction for economic reform. For example, while France, Italy and Greece 
relaxed their fiscal discipline in the 2000s, Germany implemented an ambitious programme of fiscal 
discipline and cost-suppression for her industries. In an economic environment of fixed exchange 
rates where a devaluation of the local currency is impossible, increased German competitiveness 
and exports led to current account deficits and debts for other Eurozone partners. This imbalance 
threatens the very existence of the European Union, increasingly tempting countries such as Italy to 
leave the monetary union in order to regain their competitiveness through a devalued national 
currency.  
When the money markets closed for Greece and the country appealed for help to her EU partners, a 
GDP fall was well overdue. The country had been spending above its means and that had to stop. 
However, eight years and 300 billion worth of loans later, the result of EU’s intervention was 
devastation, not rejuvenation for the Greek economy. There has been a 25% drop in the country’s 
GDP, severe hardship for the weakest members of the Greek society and migration of 15% of the 
country’s workforce. Yet the pathogens that led to the Greek crisis remained largely intact. There 
were many episodes, referendums, changes of government and tweaks of policies but the key 
mechanism that triggered action was never a concerted effort to reform the Greek economy. What 
triggered action in the Greek case was the need to quickly reverse large deficits into large surpluses. 
Greek governments would initially resist and then succumb. And with each cycle the economy 
shrank further – even healthy businesses struggled and more of the country’s labour force fled 
abroad, reducing the surplus and creating strong head-winds for the Greek recovery. Yet the EU and 
the IMF would demand even higher surpluses the next year, and all over again. These policies of 
enforced austerity have had the catastrophic multiplier effects of inverse Keynesianism in times of 
acute recession. And as the Greek economy and society suffered, so did the reputation of the 
European Union amongst the people that comprise it.  
 
EU can be a force for good - but needs democratic capital  
The European Union is a project that has ensured peace and economic cooperation in a troubled 
continent. Importantly, the EU can and should be a platform for progressive and moderate policies 
which can reduce inequality, promote education, shorten the working day and protect the 
environment.  
The Greek crisis proved the European Union’s determination to stick together and show solidarity to 
an ailing member – albeit inconsistently and with harsh strings attached. However, the crisis also 
exposed the deeply problematic economic architecture of the Eurozone: a monetary union that lacks 
fiscal and supply-side policy coordination. Fundamental to these weaknesses as well as to the way 
the Greek crisis was addressed is what I would call the union’s lack of democratic capital and 
mandate.  
The European Union needs to change and the fundamental question that needs to be addressed is: 
What is the European Union? Ultimately, what do EU citizens want it to be? 
If Europeans prefer to retain their national autonomy then the EU is destined to be a confederation 
of countries with separate interests, negotiating compromises. In this case more countries could 
enter this loose union while other countries will eventually have to exit - depending on members’ 
ever shifting national interests and priorities. EU mechanisms and legislation will need to adjust to 
this reality. And specific questions will need an answer: Can countries expect a bail out in the future? 
Can debt forgiveness be repeated? Is there any time and money limit for EU’s support to members in 
trouble? Ultimately, under what conditions could members expel one of their number and how 
would that happen in a relatively orderly fashion?  
On the other hand, if Europeans subscribe to a vision of ever-increasing integration, eventually 
leading to a United States of Europe, then a completely different course of action needs to be taken. 
The EU will need to stop expanding its borders and devote itself to the herculean task of 
consolidating its territories and start building its identity as one Nation. Fiscal unity and supply-side 
policy co-ordination will be inevitable, and so will the transfer of power from national parliaments to 
the European Parliament.  
Both courses of action have distinct benefits and drawbacks. Possibly both could work in the long 
term. The problem with the European Union of our times however is that its institutions are geared 
towards great integration while many of its citizens seem to have a different opinion. Brexit as well 
as electoral results in Italy, France, Hungary, Poland and other countries indicate a growing 
discontent with the European Union.   
It may seem absurd in a rapidly changing world presenting the EU will an endless supply of smaller or 
bigger crises, but the first priority of the European Union should be open dialogue. The EU needs to 
approach its citizens directly and explain its immense potential as a force for progress. It also has to 
listen to their concerns, seek their input and obtain their democratic mandate for any changes to 
come. If the union sleepwalks into an destination determined by past generations of citizens and 
their priorities, then the union will eventually break. The European Union’s future depends on its 
democratic legitimisation.  
 
 
 
 
